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COMMENTS
FunmE INTERESTS-EFFECT OF CHANGE OF CoNDITIONS ON
RIGHTS OF ENTRY AND PossrnILITIES OF REvERTER CREATED TO CoNTROL THE UsE OF LANo--The owner of land who desires to control its
future use has a wide variety of legal devices available. The most
familiar are the use of restrictive covenants which give rise i.o equitable
servitudes, enforceable by injunction, the special limitation which
provides for an automatic termination of the grantee's estate if he
deviates from the required use, and the condition subsequent which
leaves in the grantor a right of re-entry exercisable at his option if the
grantee breaches the condition by putting the land to a non-conforming
use. Thus, because he wanted to keep his grazing cattle in sight, the
owner of a lot now lying within Boston sold it many years ago subject
to the condition that the height of buildings thereon should not exceed
thirteen feet. Though the cattle are no longer grazing, the condition
may still prevent the erection of taller buildings.1
There are some marked differences in the law with reference to
restrictive covenants, on the one hand, and conditions and limitations
on the other. One of the most significant differences rests in their
potential duration. Whereas courts of equity will refuse enforcement
of restrictive covenants after conditions have changed so as to make the
restrictions undesirably burdensome, and law courts may give only
nominal damages for breach of the covenant, a change of conditions
which has eliminated the reason which prompted the creation of a
right of entry or possibility of reverter is supposed to be immaterial.2
The latter restrictions, in the absence of a statute limiting their duration,
can be enforced, at least in theory, no matter how long after their creaLEACH, CAsEs AND MATERIALS oN FUTURE !NTERESTs, 2d ed., 50 (1940).
For the common law background of conditional estates see Walsh, -"Conditional
Estates and Covenants Running with the land,'' 14 N.Y. Umv. L.Q. REv. 162 (1936);
Bordwell, ''The Common Law Scheme of Estates," 18 IowA L. REv. 425 (1933). The
several purposes served by possibilities of reverter and conditions subsequent are illustrated
in Brake, "Fees Simple Defeasible," 28 KY. L.J. 424 (1940).
1

2
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tion the forbidden event comes to pass.3 When a change of circumstances has occurred, then, conditions subsequent and special limitations adversely affect the value of land and render the title less marketable. 4 They also constitute a hindrance on alienability because, with
the passage of time, the heirs of the grantor multiply and it becomes
impossible to trace all of them to obtain a release. 5 A second significant
difference rests in the fact that restrictive covenants are frequently held
void when the burden is not created for the benefit of other property.6
In contrast, conditions subsequent and special limitations can be
created for entirely personal reasons, with the result that owners of
land are often prevented from utilizing it in ways made appropriate
by the passage of time and changes in the neighborhood. 7
In only a few states is there legislation undertaking to curb the
duration of rights of entry and possibilities of reverter. Even in these
states, the statutes, far from striking at the root of the evil in appropriate
situations, lay down only general directives. 8 It can be stated that
3 In the United States, rights of entry and poSSI"bilities of reverter have been held not
subject to the Rule against Perpetuities. One of the reasons given is that there are always
persons in esse who can convey the whole fee and therefore the power of alienation, at
least in theory, is not suspended. But the Rule against Perpetuities strikes down executory
interests at least even though they do not suspend the power of alienation. See Sn.ms,
HANDBOOK OF nm LAw OF FUTURB lNrERESTS 375 (1951). Professor Simes suggests
that the reason is purely historical. On the subject see CLABK, REAL CoVENANTS AND
OnmR lNTEREsTs WHICH RUN WITH LAND, 2d ed., 197 (1947); 28 Mxca. L. REv. 1015
(1930); 133 A.L.R. 1476 (1941).
4Van Vliet and Place, Inc. v. Gaines, 249 N.Y. 106, 162 N.E. 600 (1928).
5 Restrictive covenants also designed to control the use of land nevertheless come to
an end when the original purpose cannot be enforced either because of impossibility or
change of conditions. Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 31 N.E. 691 (1892). They
can also be removed as a cloud on title. McArthur v. Hood Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372,
109 N.E. 162 (1915).
6 5 PROPERTY RBSTATBMBNT §537(a) (1940); Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188,
2 N.E. 946 (1885).
7 For other objectionable features of these interests in land see Goldstein, ''Rights of
Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land," 54 HARv. L.
RBv. 248 (1940). Some decisions hold that since the enactment of the Statute Quia
Emptores, determinable fees cannot be created. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2d ed., §93
(1920). The reason is that such fees imply tenure which was abolished by the statute.
But generally in the United States possibilities of reverter have been recognized. Eminent
writers have, however, expressed the view that the statute forbids determinable fees. See
1 SxMBs, THB LAw oF Funnra lNrEREsTs 321 (1936).
s Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 30, §§37b,d,e,f. This statute makes possibilities of reverter
inalienable and not devisable, limits their duration to fifty years. Such interests are extinguished on the dissolution of a corporation when the corporation reserves them. See comment, 43 ILL. L. RBv. 90 (1948). Mass. Laws Ann. (1933) c. 184, §23, limits the
restrictions on land to a thirty-year period, but only where a longer period is not specified
in a deed or will. Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §26.46 forbids frivolous or trivial conditions
attached to the conveyances. Wis. Stat. (1951) §230.46 is similar to the Michigan statute.
Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §500.20. This statute covers conditions by devise as well as by
grant and limits the duration to the time they are of substantial benefit to the owners. The
duration of these interests is also limited to thirty years, but here, regardless of the grantor's
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until the present time the task of mitigation and adaptation to modem
exigencies in this field has been left largely to the courts;
Because the right of entry and the possibility of reverter are legal
interests in land that can be enforced by a simple ejectrnent action,
courts of equity have not been able to apply any doctrine of change of
conditions to prevent enforcement. As a result, the traditional aversion to forfeitures has constantly taxed the courts' ingenuity in coping
with situations where the divesting of estates would be unconscionable.9
It is the purpose of this comment to examine the skills which courts
have developed to avoid inequitable results which might arise from
forfeiture of estates, and, further, to attempt to demonstrate that judicial
opinion may be in a transitional stage, tending to incorporate into law
the equitable doctrine of change of conditions in disposing of cases
involving rights of entry and possibilities of reverter.10

I. Constructional Preferences
This paper will not deal separately with the two interests in land, as
the courts have generally leaned toward construing a deed as creating
a condition rather than a limitation and there is a dearth of cases dealing
chiefly with possibilities of reverter. Apparently the courts have preferred to meet the challenge of forfeitures at the constructional level,
finding possibilities of reverter only when they would not entail inequitable results.11 An estate on condition subsequent terminates only
intent to prolong his interest. A six-year statute of limitations is set for assertion of a right
of re-entry.
In general as to statutory provisions concerning the duration of these interests in land,
see CLARX, REAL COVENANTS AND Onmn lNTERESTs WHICH RUN WITH LAND, 2d ed.,
197 et seq. (1947); SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AFFECTING lNTERESTS IN
LAND 236 (1953); Goldstein, ''Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to
Restrict the Use of Land," 54 HARv. L. REv. 248 (1940).
9 As an example of the strict views taken by the courts in general, it may be stated
as a proposition needing no citation of authority that the absence of a re-entry clause today
may by itself be sufficient to avoid the finding of a condition subsequent. Yet in Littleton's
time express language of condition was given effect as a condition subsequent subject to
forfeiture whether or not a clause of forfeiture was used. LlTTLBTON, TENURES (Wambaugh ed.) §§328-330 (1903). At that time, however, restrictive covenants were unknown.
10 For examples of capricious conditions imposed in deeds of grant, and for examples
of estates created in favor of one without any interest deserving protection, see Scott, "Con•
trol of Property by the Dead," 65 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 527 (1917). Valid social purposes,
however, may still be served by these interests in land in some cases. See Brake, "Fee
Simple Defeasible," 28 KY. L.J. 424 (1940). In England, rights of re-entry are subject to
the Rule against Perpetuities. Law of Property Act of 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, §4(3)
(1925).
11 E.g., in Johnson v. Lane, 199 Ark. 740, 135 S.W. (2d) 853 (1940), the granter
had donated land worth $20,000 on the condition that $250,000 was to be spent to build
a schoolhouse on it, the deed to be absolute so long as the land was used for school
purposes. After three years, there was still no school. The plaintiff was a creditor of the
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by election of the grantor or his successors,1 2 and not automatically, as
in the case of a determinable fee.
One of the major difficulties encountered by the courts in attempting to prevent unwarranted forfeitures stems from the fact that if a
possibility of reverter is declared extinguished, the estate of the grantee
becomes ipso facto enlarged beyond the grant. Moreover, doctrines of
waiver and estoppel cannot easily he applied to one who holds a possibility of reverter, since the fee is supposed to revert back to him automatically on the happening of the contemplated event. Out of this largely
doctrinal difficulty,1 3 the courts have developed a disregard for distinctions and shown constructional preferences among the several possible
interests created or reserved.14
In Sanford 11. Sims1 5 the court stated: "Technically, perhaps, there
is a distinction between a possibility of reverter and a right of re-entry
for breach of condition subsequent; but the distinction is usually not
observed and the possibility of reverter and right of re-entry for condition broken are treated as the same."16 The court then found a condition subsequent but it concluded that it was ineffective after the
running of the statute of limitations.17 In Priddy 11. School District1 8
the hahendum clause read: ". . . as long as used for a school house
site. If it is ever abandoned as a school house site, said land shall revert
to...."19 The-possibility of a determinable fee was not even discussed,
and a condition subsequent was found instead.20
. grantor. No changes in circumstances appeared. A determinable fee was found. In Stewart
v. Blain, (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) 159 S.W. 928, deed shall be "void and inoperative" in
the event of removal of the schoolhouse. Held to create a determinable fee. The court,
again, rejected fine distinctions and was content to point out that the parties must have
meant to create a possibility of reverter.
12 As between a fee on condition subsequent and a condition precedent, the courts
favor the former, as it permits the early vesting of estates. De Conick v. De Conick, 154
Mich. 187, 117 N.W. 570 (1908); Gordon v. Whittle, 206 Ga. 339, 57 S.E. (2d) 169
(1950).
13 Dunham, "Possibilities of Reverter and Powers of Termination-Fraternal or Identical Twins?" 20 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 215 (1953).
14See 15 L.R.A. 231 (1908); 47 A.L.R. 1174 (1927).
1rs 192 Va. 644, 66 S.E. (2d) 495 (1951).
16 Id. at 648.
17 For further material on the disregard of the distinction between possibilities of
reverter and conditions subsequent, see 33 AM. Jtm., Life Estates, Remainders, and Reversions §§205, 208 (1941); 16 A.L.R. (2d) 1246 (1951).
1s 92 Okla. 254, 219 P. 141 (1923).
19 Id. at 265.
20The same was held in Bay City Land Co. v. Craig, 72 Ore. 31, 143 P. 911 (1914),
where the deed contained language of reverter and provided that grantor shall become
owner "as fully and absolutely as if this deed had not been made." In Stewart v. Blain,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1913) 159 S.W. 928, the distinction between possibilities of reverter and
conditions subsequent was called "largely fanciful."
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In Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Ennis-Calvert Compress Co.,21 the
grantee had built a cotton compress on the land and maintained it from
1877 to 1892. Suit was brought in 1900. The deed contained the
following language: ". . . on the happening of any one of said several
contingencies . . .. title and possession of the tract herein conveyed
shall . . . by force thereof, and without the necessity of a reconveyance,
ipso facto revert to and vest in said [grantor] its successors and
assigns. . . ."22 The court found that only a condition subsequent
was created and saved the remote grantee's title despite a breach of
condition by holding a corporation as not the successor to the right of
grantor corporation. In Wagner v. Wallowa County2 3 one of the
reasons why the court refused to find that clear words of reverter
created a determinable fee was that if the title was to revert back, the
whole fee passed to the grantee. This reason would make reverter
clauses inadequate to create special limitations in all cases.24
The constructional preference for conditions as opposed to limitations, on the surface, does not show anything more than dislike of
forfeitures because the condition subsequent is less drastic. One may
argue that it does not alleviate the change of conditions problem because
forfeiture is still possible. But a close scrutiny of the cases will show
that the constructional preference for conditions is often only the first
step in the process of clearing title in meritorious cases. A further
finding of expiration of the condition for performance, or waiver, or
mere substantial delay in pursuing the remedy of re-entry often follows.
This second step is effective in forever freeing land of conditions and
will be taken in cases where a change of circumstances has made the
second :finding equitable. Illustrations of this proposition can be found
in a study of the facts of the cases cited in this section as well as in
cases cited in section IV of this comment. Very often the delay necessary to induce the court to declare a condition extinct is not even the
period required for the statute of limitations to run. In these cases
the courts do not say "laches" only because a court in a legal action
of ejectment is not supposed to apply equitable doctrines. The fourth
21 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) 56 S.W. 367, error refused.
22 Id. at 368. Emphasis added.
23 76 Ore. 453, 148 P. 1140 (1915).
24Bemard v. Bowen, 214 N.C. 121, 198 S.E. 584 (1938). See also Williams v. Box
Church Baptist Church, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 75 S.W. (2d) 134 ("so long as said
premises are used as agreed herein" and reverter clause; held, a condition subsequent. One
strong dissent). Priddy v. School District, 92 Okla. 254, 219 P. 141 (1923); Jones v.
McLain, (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) 41 S.W. 714; Dyer v. Siano, 298 Mass. 537, 11 N.E.
(2d) 451 (1937).

1954]

CoMMENTS

251

section of this comment will again touch on thi~ point with citation
of authorities.

II. Total Disregard of Distinctions between Restrictions on Land
So far, only one case has bluntly rejected all kinds of distinctions
and held that a change in the neighborhood would deprive the owner
of a power of termination of the right to enforce a forfeiture of the
grantee's estate. In Letteau v. Ellis2 5 the defendant breached the condition by allowing Negro occupancy of the premises. The neighborhood had become largely inhabited by Negro families since the time
of conveyance. In denying the forfeiture of defendant's estate, the
court declared:
'We find it needless to follow appellant's arguments on the
technical rules and distinctions made between conditions, covenants, and mere restrictions.... A principle of broad public policy
has intervened to the extent that modem progress is deemed to
necessitate a sacrifice of many former claimed individual rights.
The only obstacle met has been . . . the disinclination to disturb
vested property rights. To some extent this, too, has yielded in the
sense that many rights formerly labeled as property rights by a
process of academic relation are now considered merely personal
and have been subjected to the common good."26
This case has met with the approval of learned writers,27 but unfortunately it is ignored by the courts of jurisdictions other than California.
This disregard of distinctions between legal future interests and the
equitable servitude represents a true incorporation of the equitable
doctrine of change of conditions into law. Authority for it is still scant
and that is the reason why it is more nearly accurate to say that the
courts are now in a stage of transition rather than having accepted the
equitable doctrine of change of conditions.
25 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P. (2d) 496 (1932), hearing den. by California Supreme
Court, June 13, 1932. Accord, Forman v. Hancock, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 291, 39 P. (2d)
249 (1934), hearing den. by California Supreme Court, Feb. 18, 1935.
20 Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584 at 588-589, 10 P. (2d) 496 (1932). The
court found support in a dictum found in Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573 at 587, 205
S.W. 217 (1918): ''If the court ••• had found ••• that the conditions had so changed
since the conveyance was made ••• that an enforcement of the restriction no longer could
serve the original purpose, then it would have been improper to allow the forfeiture."
27Walsh, "Conditional Estates and Covenants Running with the Land," 14 N.Y.
UNIV. L.Q. REv. 162 at 191 (1937); Ferrier, "Determinable Fees and Fees upon Condition Subsequent in California,'' 24 CALIP. L. REv. 512 at 516 (1933); Goldstein, "Rights
of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of ~d,'' 54 HAB.v.
L. REv. 248 at 268 (1940).
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III. The Courts' Main Weapon: Constructional Devices to Avoid
Conditions and Limitations
One need cite no authorities for the proposition that the courts
look upon forfeitures with disfavor and will consequently construe
strictly all clauses pointing to the creation of rights of re-entry and
possibilities of reverter. Literally any of the cases cited in this paper
can be found to contain a reference to this judicial attitude. Thus a
mere recital of purposes, even to the exclusion of all other uses, is
generally inadequate to create such interests. The courts' strictness
has in some instances reached astounding proportions. It is difficult
to ascribe some results to anything but change of circumstances and
passage of time concurring to make the recognition of future interests
most inequitable.
In Storke v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co.28 a deed
dated 1889 conveying property, then outside Chicago, included antisaloon restrictions and the following language: ". . . in case of breach
in these covenants or any of them said premises shall immediately
revert to the grantors, and the said party of the second part shall forfeit
all right, title and interest in and to said premises."29 By 1945, sixteen
more saloons were operating in the neighborhood and a saloon had
been kept on the premises for eleven years. The tract is now a business
section in Chicago. The defendant insurance company, lessor of the
saloon keeper, had paid $42,500 for the premises. In trying to deny
the plaintiff's argument that a determinable fee had been created, the
defendant himself was at such a loss that he argued that a condition
subsequent was created instead and that it had been waived. The
court relieved the defendant in an ingenious fashion: since the plaintiffs sued for a partition as successors of the grantor, they must show
title in themselves to succeed. There was no language of limitation
in the deed, therefore a determinable fee was not created, and the
plaintiffs did not yet have title. At this point the courts normally £.nd
a condition subsequent as the alternative to a possibility of reverter
barely missed. Such a conclusion would, however, have left the
defendant still open to possible attacks on his title. But the court
went on to point out that if a condition subsequent was created, the
plaintiffs must make re-entry to get title. However, plaintiffs were
precluded since there was no re-entry clause in the deed. The court
seemed to be saying that the defendant had a fee simple on condition
2s 390 ill. 619, 61 N.E. (2d) 552 (1945).
29 Id. at 621.
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subsequent, but that no one had a right of re-entry for condition broken.
It is perhaps significant that the court points out that if the clause had
created a restrictive covenant, it would be unenforceable now because
of change of circumstances in the subdivision, which by this time had
become valuable business property.
In In re Copps Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church30 the deed
conveyed a lot in 1871 "so long as said lot is held and used for church
purposes." The court found in 1929 that an absolute fee was transferred. It was the opinion of the court that since the limiting words
appeared only in the habendum, they could not reduce the grant. A
strong dissent pointed out that determinable fees have often been
recognized though the limiting words appeared only in the habendurn.
The majority distinguished an earlier conveyance solely because of
lack of the words "and no longer" at the end of the clause introduced
by "so long as."31 It does not seem unreasonable to conclude that the
court felt it would be unfair to let a remote successor or heir get a
church building with all the additions after a long time following the
grant.
When rights of re-entry and possibilities of reverter are created to
prescribe or forbid certain uses of land, the similarity they bear to real
covenants has offered the court the most widely wielded weapon of
defense in the struggle against the draftsman. It has been stated that
"a clause in a deed will be construed as a covenant, unless apt words of
condition are used, and even then it will not be held to create a condition, unless it is apparent from the whole instrument and the circumstances that a strict condition was intended."32 In St. Peter's Church v.
Bragaw3 3 the deed contained clear language of condition and reverter
in case of breach. The court said, "There is no interest which is not
adequately protected by regarding the clause as intended to create a
80 120 Ohio St. 309, 166 N.E. 218 (1929). Cf. Schurch v. Hanaman, 47 Ohio App.
383, 191 N.E. 907 (1933).
81 In Chouteau v. St. Louis, 331 Mo. 781, 55 S.W. (2d) 299 (1932), words of condition were held unavailing. More than a century after the conveyance, the heirs of the
grantor sued to recover the land since it was no longer used as a site for a courthouse. The
court held that since words of condition introduced a new clause, they expressed a limitation of the estate granted, and since no forfeiture clause or re-entry clause was inserted,
no right of re-entry was created. The court at the same time declared that the grantee's
having lived up to the condition for more than a century was perhaps nothing less than
what the grantor anticipated. See also Sapper v. Mathers, 286 Pa. 364, 133 A. 565 (1926),
47 A.L.R. ll72 (1927) (use as a cemetery discontinued after 100 years. No condition
or limitation because of lack of words of forfeiture. The court points out that the plaintiffs
had no equity). Lynch v. Melton, 150 N.C. *595, 64 S.E. 497 (1909).
32 Hinton v. Vinson, 180 N.C. 393 at 396, 104 S.E. 897 at 899 (1920). Emphasis
added.
33 144 N.C. 89, 56 S.E. 688 (1907).
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covenant or limitation in trust that the property shall not be used for
the one certain purpose mentioned."34 ' Land was conveyed in Gordon
v. Whittle35 " • • • upon the express condition that the second party
shall lay out and set aside and dedicate . . . [land] for a park and
recreation center, and to be forever maintained as such -for the benefit
of the residential and philanthropic enterprises of the second party on
said St. Simon's Island."36 The condition remained unperformed for
more than 22 years, when a grantee sued to clear title. The court took
three steps to accomplish that end in view of grantors' long acquiescence. First, as no one can dedicate land without owning it, the
condition, if any, must have been subsequent. Secondly, lack of words
of defeasance or forfeiture rule out a condition subsequent, and a
covenant must be found instead. Thirdly, the grantor himself could
not enforce the covenant because it is declared to be for the benefit of
the grantee. In short, the words quoted were mere surplusage. It is
hard to believe that if the suit had been brought shortly after the conveyance, when conditions had not yet changed so much, the court
would have reached the same result in the face of a dear breach.
A forfeiture in W. F. White Land Co. v. Christenson31 would have
injured the holder of a mortgage on the lot, the holder of a mechanic's
lien, and the remote grantee himself. It does not seem improbable that
the change of condition, even in this respect, carried some weight with
the court. The building of a house worth less than $5,000 and
closer to the curb than specified were conceded to be breaches. The
deed read, "In case the said grantee ... shall ... violate any one of said
conditions . . . the said land and all improvements . . . shall immediately revert to and become the property of the grantor . . . and
it shall be lawful for said grantor . . . to re-enter said premises as in its
first and former estate."38 Another clause gave the grantor as well as
neighboring landowners the right to enforce the conditions whether
breached or about to be breached. Clearly one provision was intended
to reserve to the grantor a "gambler's chance of recovering the property,"
and the other was in the nature of a restrictive covenant. Despite the
strong language pointing to a possibility of reverter, the court concluded
that the latter clause and the circumstances pointed to a covenant to
benefit adjoining land. The court seemed aware of its startling inter3 4 Id.

at 94. The word "abandonment" was construed not to include a sale of the

land.
85 206 Ga. 339,
86 Id. at 339.

57 S.E. (2d) 169 (1950).

s1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 14 S.W. (2d) 369.
8s Id.

at 370. Emphasis added.
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pretation when it said: "In view of the right so given [to enJOlil
breaches], the grantor is in no position to claim the harsher remedy of
forfeiture of title."39 Obviously the court imposed an election of
remedies on the grantor. 40
The expressed or unexpressed intent to benefit adjoining property
may of itself spell defeat for the draftsman, and be seized upon by the
courts to find a covenant despite strong language of condition, forfeiture, and re-entry. Land was conveyed in Post 11. W eil41 in 1807
upon the special condition that no part of the land or buildings should
ever be occupied as a tavern. Since it appeared that the original plan
was to benefit adjoining property, only a covenant running with the
land was found to exist 80 years after the conveyance. The court
rather openly declared that, "Although the words of the clause . . . are
apt to describe a condition subsequent, . . . we are in no wise obliged
to take them literally."42 The case makes specific reference to change
of circumstances and the injustice that would follow if a condition were
recognized.
In Scaling 11. Sutton43 the deed recited that "In order to secure the
erection of private residential buildings of a good grade . . . and to
carry out a general plan for the . . . benefit . . . of each . . . purchaser
of lots . . . this deed is made upon the following express conditions,
the violation of any one of which by the grantee . . . shall give the
right to said Clover Land Co. to reenter upon said premises . . . and
terminate all of the rights of grantee. . . ."44 The court held that a
covenant enforceable by adjoining owners was created. An amusing
feature of this case is that, in order to escape the force of a covenant,
the grantee himself argued that a condition subsequent had been
created, but even he argued to no avail. The deed in Carruthers 11.
Spaulding45 also recited that the conditions were for the benefit of the
entire tract and that on failure to observe them the land would revert
to the grantor. The court avoided a forfeiture by declaring that the
Id. at 372.
40 That the granter may elect: Munro v. Syracuse L. & N. R. Co., 200 N.Y. 224, 93
N.E. 516 (1910). It may not be without signilicance, as reflecting a lack of faith in the
force of the forfeiture clause, that in the White Land Co. case the granter, while electing
to forfeit the grantee's estate, added also a prayer for an injunction as an alternative relief.
For other examples of utilization of the technique of finding a covenant to avoid conditions
and limitations, see Carolina & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Carpenter, 165 N.C. 465, 81 S.E. 682
(1914); Hawkins v. Third, 244 Ala. 534, 14 S. (2d) 513 (1943).
41115 N.Y. 361, 22 N.E. 145 (1889).
42 Post v. Weil, 115 N.Y. 361 at 369, 22 N.E. 145 (1889).
43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) 167 S.W. (2d) 275.
44 Id. at 277.
45 242 App. Div. 412, 275 N.Y.S. 37 (1934).
39
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recital of benefit to the tract was consistent only with construction
of the language as of an equitable restriction resulting from a
covenant. 46
Trusts or equitable charges are also resorted to by the courts as
alternatives to conditions or limitations on the fee, in the process of
construction of language indicating possibilities of reverter or rights of
re-entry. Despite the use of clear words of condition in MacKenzie v.
Trustees of Presbytery of Jersey City,47 the court announced that words
seemingly appropriate to a condition may operate to create other rights
and that". . . the absence of words of determination or reverter being
noted, the intent of the parties . . . will be best subserved by holding
the clause to be a declaration of trust."48 Although the courts are astute
in finding equitable charges on land conveyed or devised rather than
conditions or limitations, such cases, while reflecting the same judicial
abhorrence for forfeiture of estates, do not generally spring from a
desire to control the use of land but rather to insure the payment of a
money or other obligation.49
When there has been a sufficient change of circumstances, a court
may refuse to recognize a condition subsequent because the original
plan of the vendor was not included by him in subsequent sales of land.
In Brown v. Wrightman60 a 45-acre tract was conveyed in 1886 " 'upon
the following expressed condition subsequent, to-wit: . . . [there follow restrictions against selling liquor and maintaining bawdy houses]
• . . and in case of the happening of either of said events then this
grant to cease and be void.' "61 The grantor later sold lots of another
tract without including in the deed the condition subsequent. The
court pointed out that by the time the defendant acquired his lots the
46 On similar language another New York court had found a clear condition subsequent
in Schulman v. Ellenville Electric Co., 152 Misc. 843, 273 N.Y.S. 530 (1934). In this
case, however, no danger of forfeiture was present, as the owner of the right of re-entry
had released his interest.
47 67 N.J. Eq. 652, 61 A. 1027, 3 L.R.A. (n.s.) 227 (1905).
48 Id. at 661. For other examples of the utilization of the trust device, see President
and Fellows of Middlebury College v. Central Power Corp. of Vermont, 101 Vt. 325, 143
A. 384 (1928) ("it is a condition of this devise," etc.); Delaware Land & Development Co.
v. First & Central Presbyterian Church of Wilmington, 16 Del. Ch. 410, 147 A. 165
(1929) (land to be used for certain purposes, "and to no other use, intent or purpose
whatsoever").
49 Daly v. Wilke, 111 ill. 382 (1884) ("subject, however, to the terms and conditions
herein limited" held a charge). The same in Parsons v. Millar, 189 Ill. 107, 59 N.E. 616
(1901) ("provided that"); Spangler v. Newman, 239 ill. 606, 88 N.E. 202 (1909) ("on
the condition that he pay to"); Canal Bank v. Hudson, Ill U.S. 66, 4 S.Ct. 303 (1884)
("under penalty, in case of non compliance, of loss of the above property").
60 5 Cal. App. 391, 90 P. 467 (1907).
111 Id. at 392.
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neighborhood had ceased to be a respectable residential neighborhood
and had become a place devoted to lewd resort and retail of liquor, and
ruled that the defendant's clear breach of condition could no longer
entitle grantor to a recovery of the property. The court explained the
result by displaying a wholesome (in this case) confusion of contract
law with property law. Since the plaintiff (grantor) had himself contributed to the change of the neighborhood in other lots, he had waived
the condition as to the original 45 acres and estopped himself.
Counsel's argument that the grantor's conduct with respect to other
land could have no effect on his property rights in the first tract conveyed was met by the court with a quotation from a Kentucky case52
denying a right to enforce a covenant to one who had contributed to
rendering performance of the contract unreasonable. The court treated
the grantor's right as a restrictive covenant although the validity of the
condition subsequent in its inception was not doubted in the least.53

IV. The Courts' Last Resort: Finding No Breach, Temporary
Breach, Expiration, Waiver

The strictness of the courts does not confine itself to the constructional question of whether conditions or limitations have been created.
Where rights of re-entry or possibilities of reverter must be recognized
because of unequivocal language, the courts will proceed undaunted
to amazingly strict constructions of what events, if any, will cause a
forfeiture, and they will also take judicial notice of changes of conditions for the purpose of limiting the scope of the condition and finding
that it has exhausted its force. A recent case is particularly illustrative of the techniques of the courts, since the majority opinion had to
make use of a number of them. For the consideration of $1, land was
conveyed to a city in J. M. Carey & Brother v. City of Casper,54
"... upon the express condition that a City Hall building ...
is to be erected . . . and that said Block is to be used thereafter
for the maintenance thereon of such City Hall . . . and also for
the maintenance of a Public Park and for no other purposes . . .
in case said . . . property is disposed of for any other purposes . .
then . . . title to said . . . property shall revert to [grantor] .
its successors or assigns."55
52 Duncan v. Central Pass. R. Co., 85 Ky. 525 at 535, 4 S.W. 228 (1887).
53 The same doctrine was applied in Hanna v. Rodeo-Vallejo Ferry Co., 89 Cal.

App.
462, 265 P. 287 (1928), and Wilshire Oil Co. v. Star Petroleum Co., 93 Cal. App. 437,
269 P. 722 (1928).
54 66 Wyo. 437, 213 P. (2d) 263 (1950).
55 Id. at 448.
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The city performed for twenty years. Then, contemplating erecting
a county building jointly with the county, the city induced the grantor
to change the conditions in order to permit the joint undertaking. New
conditions were drawn which read in part:
"Provided that said real property . . . shall be used for the
maintenance thereon of a City Hall Building . . . or for the construction and maintenance thereon of a City-County building . . .
or for public park purposes, and for no other purpose whatsoever
... in the event said property, or any part thereof, is disposed of or
used for any other purpose than those herein provided, title to said
property shall revert to [grantor, successors, and assigns] . . . ."56
The plan for a county building on the block was abandoned and a new
building erected one-half mile away. The city then moved its offices
to the new building and rented most of the old City Hall to businesses
and even to one United States agency, although the conditions specified that they were intended to exclude especially state or federal uses
of the premises. The court needed so much subtlety in this case that
the opinion ran to 35 pages. The possibility of a determinable fee was
not even considered, as that would have made it impossible to free the
land of all burdens. A condition subsequent could not be avq_ided.
The court conceded that the second set of conditions had been violated,
since they forbade any use of any part of the premises for other purposes. Therefore these conditions had to be made inoperative. They
were held to be "executory," i.e., contingent on the actual erection of a
county building by the city and county jointly, and thus brushed aside
unceremoniously since the contingency never arose. This was a
remarkable achievement on the part of the court, because the new agreement contained no hint of being contingent on anything; it was an
executed substitution of one set of conditions for another. This technique opens new vistas. Any conditions might be found impliedly
contingent on some event at any time and be held to live only until a
sufficient change of circumstances makes them unreasonable. But the
court seemed hardly convinced of the soundness of its own exploit, as it
hastened to caution that in case of error on this score the violations
would be held to be only transitory and not sufficient to work a forfeiture anyway. This explanation falls a little short of rationality too,
since the violations had been carried on for seven years and the city was
making a business use of the premises for all practical purposes. As
for the first set of conditions, the court decided that "to dispose of"
li6 Id.

at

450.
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meant here only "to alienate." Even if leasing could be considered a
sort of alienation, the city had leased only most of the building, not all.
Besides, it was impossible for the court to define "City Hall purposes,"
and apparently so long as anything connected with the municipality
was being done in any corner of the building, there was a use for City
Hall purposes. But the court did not stop here, since so far the conditions would still be in force, even if in a much weaker form, and could
still endanger the city's title in the future. The court took notice of
the substantial growth of the city which had doubled its population
since the time of the conveyance and decided that even a condition
so hard to breach would be an unwarranted burden on the city. Thus
it proceeded to free the defendant city of any worry for the future. The
court held that a condition not specifying a period of time for its
duration, or a perpetuity, did not call for operation in perpetuity, but
was complied with by performance over a long term of years. The
reason was that conditions are presumed to be made on the theory that
they are subject to the exigencies of the grantee's development. In
this case the city had substantially complied long enough.57 This
seems to import the doctrine of change of circumstances squarely into
the legal structure of these interests, but only for the cases where there
is no express recital that a condition is to last in perpetuity. While this
may be very effective in practice since express recitals of perpetuity
are not common in existing conditions, still draftsmen could avoid
this pitfall in the future by merely inserting the needed recital. It thus
becomes apparent that the incorporation of the equitable doctrine of
change of conditions into this case was the result of a conscious process
of judicial innovation tailored to fit only one situation, albeit a common
one.
Where even a covenant might prove unreasonable because of the
passage of time and the change in circumstances, a court may even
57 For other cases in which courts have refused to find a breach though conceding
the validity of the condition subsequent, see Mills and Wife v. Evansville Seminary and
Others, 58 Wis. 135, 15 N.W. 133 (1883) (grantees sold the land to a shoe manufacturing
business; when granter threatened action, they had land reconveyed to themselves, hastily
repaired the premises and began to use it as a seminary anew for a few pupils by the time
granter sued). Carpenter v. Graber, 66 Tex. 465, 1 S.W. 178 (1886) (language of special
limitation restricting land to street purposes; held, obstruction by building erected by third
party, no forfeiture unless grantee delayed unreasonably in preventing forbidden use).
Dagget v. Fort Worth, (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 177 S.W. 222 (grantor must prove abandonment besides non-user). Gleghorn v. Smith, (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) 62 S.W. 1096
("solely for the purpose of a gin, and to be solely and only used for a gin site; and in the
event said real estate is not used for such purposes, then • • • said property is to revert to
me"; held, even though parts of the tract are used for other purposes, no forfeiture so long
as a gin was operated on the premises; reason: no forfeiture provision specifically for additional uses). Skipper v. Davis, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 59 S.W. (2d) 454.
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strive to construe a clause as creating a condition subsequent and then
strike it down by finding it extinguished because of lapse of time. A
deed conveyed land to a railroad in 1878 strictly for railroad purposes
and included words of reverter in case of breach.58 The clause, however, recited that the grantee covenanted and agreed to perform. In
1926 the grantee moved to another depot and kept only a track on a
small strip of the land. Then it built a filling station on the property
and leased it. In 1938 it conveyed the land outright to the plaintiff,
who kept an auto repair shop and a gasoline station on the land and
sued in 1949 to clear title. The presence of a covenant for railroad
purposes might prove very burdensome, since the land was now in the
hands of a non-railroad enterprise. The court found a condition subsequent despite words of covenant, and held that it had been breached
in 1926, and that grantor's successors were now barred by a fifteenyear statute of limitations. The court resorted in this case to a kind of
reverse doctrine of "substantial compliance," as it held that the maintenance of a roadbed on a small strip was not sufficient to prevent a
breach in 1926 (substantial breach doctrine?). On the basis of the
City of Casper case,59 could anyone doubt that if lack of a breach had
been necessary to prevent an inequitable result the same facts would
have been held to constitute substantial compliance? The hopelessness of the grantor's successor's case is further brought out later in the
opinion. Counsel argued that a breach occurred in 1938 only when
the land was conveyed to plaintiff, since until then the land was held
under the same deed of conveyance and the railroad had only leased
the premises, no adverse possession being shown. Thus in 1949 the
statute of limitations would still be running. The court's answer is a
masterpiece of inconsistency, but it served to relieve a party from an
unconscionable forfeiture more than 70 years after the conveyance. It
stated that if there was no breach in I 926, there was still no breach in
1950, since a railroad line was still crossing a small segment of the land,
and consequently the land was still being used for railroad purposes.
Nothing but change of conditions would seem to induce the court to
strain its analysis to this extent.
In one case the court refused to enforce a forfeiture purely and
simply on the ground of laches although the plaintiff had brought an
ejectment action, and the statute of limitations had not run. The
validity of the condition was not questioned. The plaintiff did nothing
5s Sanford v. Sims, 192 Va. 644, 66 S.E. (2d) 495 (1951).
59 See

note 55 supra.
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to estop himself. Improvements had been built on the land. As the
grantor had notice of the violation since its inception, the fact that he
waited eleven years to sue caused the court to reject his claim, saying,
"This is peculiarly a case for the application of equitable principles."60
What else but the change of conditions brought about by the improvements made the case peculiarly one for the application of equitable
principles?
Often if the consideration for the condition is found to have been
appreciation of remaining land of the grantor, the condition will be
held inoperative as soon as the purpose can no longer be carried out.
Such contingency may arise either from a change in the location or
from sale of adjoining property by the grantor, who thereby loses any
real interest in the condition. In these cases the distinction between
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry is even more baldly disregarded. 61
Another technique used by the courts to prevent forfeitures even
if a condition subsequent is found is to curtail its operation to a reasonable time only. The condition expressed in Board of Commissioners
of Oklahoma County 11. Russel62 specified that the land was to be used
as a courthouse site, that trees and ornaments should be planted and
cared for by annual special appropriations. A reverter clause was
inserted. The condition was performed from 1910 to 1938, when the
uses and appropriations were discontinued. The court seized upon the
fact that the clause did not specify any length of time for the duration
of the condition, took judicial notice of the fact that everyone knows
that cities develop in time and that the old accommodations become inadequate. There was then full compliance in this case, since the condition was to last only a reasonable time.63 As a matter of fact, sufficient
changes had occurred to make further performance of the condition
absurd or nearly so.
Other factors of varied nature and compelling significance may be
seized upon by the courts to relieve a party. Thus, when the grantee
of a fee on condition subsequent is later precluded by law from using
60 Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Early, 162 Pa. 338 at
61 Stevens v. Galveston H. & S.A. Ry. Co., (Tex. Comm.

340, 29 A. 736 (1894).
App. 1919) 212 S.W. 639;
Maddox v. Adair, (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) 66 S.W. 811; Dagget v. City of Fort Worth,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 177 S.W. 222. As to relevance of the consideration as indicative
of intent when nominal or valuable, see 116 A.L.R. 76 (1938).
62 (10th Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 778, cert. den. 338 U.S. 820, 70 S.Ct. 64 (1949).
63 The same doctrine was applied in Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co. v. Barbour, 89 Ind.
375 (1883); Sheller v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 108 Wash. 348, 184 P. 344 (1919);
Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Binnie, 59 Ark. 66, 26 S.W. 528 (1894). See also 7
A.L.R. 817 (1920).
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the land for the purposes designated, a forfeiture is excused,64 and the
conditions may be held enforceable only so long as one owns property
in the tract supposed to benefit from them.65
As indirectly illustrated in some of the preceding cases, a court may
utilize a concept of the law of contracts and hold that substantial compliance with the condition was shown despite other forbidden users or
discontinuance.66 In Central Land Company v. City of Grand Rapids61
the grantor himself, suing in ejectment only two years after the conveyance, was denied a forfeiture. The land was conveyed "upon the
express condition that ... land ... shall be used solely for park, highway, street, and boulevard purposes; and if any part thereof be not used
for any of such purposes, or at any time cease to be used for such
purposes, or at any time be used for any other purpose, said part or
parts shall immediately revert to the grantor...."68 Oil was discovered
on the land and the city authorized drilling operations by an oil company. The court ignored the specific restrictions and held that the
drilling really did not cause a substantial part of the park to be interfered with in the uses for which it was conveyed. The case is remarkable because the grantor had more than a legitimate interest in seeking
a forfeiture, since it owned adjoining land, and oil taken from under
the park would diminish his supply.
The conduct of a granter before and after the breach of a condition
is carefully scrutinized by the courts in the search for waivers of performance of the condition. A short wait before suit may, in and of
itself, bar the grantor. 69 Mere silence of the grantor, even without
acts in reliance by the grantee, may constitute a waiver. 70 The "waiver"
64 United States v. 2086 Acres of Land More or Less, situate in Spartansburg County,
S.C., (D.C. S.C. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 411.
65 Second Church of Christ, Scientist, of Akron v. Le Prevost, 67 Ohio App. 101, 35
N.E. (2d) 1015 (1941).
66 Brooks v. Kimball County, 127 Neb. 645, 256 N.W. 501 (1934) (maintenance of
a courthouse for 35 years held substantial compliance freeing the fee of any burden);
McKissick v. Pickle, 16 Pa. 140 (1851) (for schoolhouse, religious use and burying
ground only, plus reverter clause. Renting to a tenant held only a temporary diversion).
See also 137 A.L.R. 639 (1942).
67 302 Mich. 105, 4 N.W. (2d) 485 (1942).
as Id. at 107. Emphasis added.
69 Tough v. Netsch, 83 N.H. 374, 142 A. 702 (1928) (slightly more than one year
wait).
70 First Christian Church of Vera v. Spinks, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 260 S.W. 1073,
reversed on other grounds (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 273 S. W. 815 (church not built in 24
months, contrary to condition, grantee conveying nine years later to third party). Gleghorn
v. Smith, (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) 62 S.W. 1096 (court declares that if it should be mis•
taken in finding no breach, a waiver of performance shown anyway since the plaintiff
stood by while the defendant was erecting a residence on the premises).
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cases as a whole indicate a general approach of the courts to the problem
more in keeping with contract principles than property law.
When the grantor or assigns may be adequately protected by compensation or damages, a court may refuse forfeiture for breach of a condition subsequent on that ground. 71
The courts will be strict in deciding who is bound by a condition.
If a condition applies expressly to a grantee or lessee and no mention
is made of heirs, executors, or assigns, the condition subsequent may
become breach-proof after the death of the grantee or lessee,72 or even
earlier where the assignee of the grantee breaches the condition when
assigns are not mentioned in the forfeiture clause.73
Of course, if a condition violates public policy, it will be entirely
disregarded. 74 On this score it is surprising to note that in view of the
policy reflected in the rule against perpetuities and against restraints
on alienation, the courts do not draw freely on the analogy and rest their
decisions squarely on the ground that conditions and limitations may, in
time, become violative of public policy.
Finally, plain ignorance of a breach may constitute a good defense
against forfeiture. 75 In Bonniwell 11. Madison76 the court conceded
that the condition subsequent had been breached by a failure to keep
up a fence. However, the grantee's tenant had failed to inform him.
The court held that to warrant a forfeiture a breach must be willful
and show an intent not to comply with the condition.

IV. Conclusion
It seems reasonable to conclude from the foregoing review of authorities that a draftsman wanting to frame conditions or limitations
strong enough to withstand the assault of time and changes in the
circumstances of the location of the land would be confronted with
an overwhelmingly difficult task. Respectable authority can be found
for the most varied and unpredictable propositions. It would also seem
71 Benyman v. Schumacker, 67 Tex. 312, 3 S.W. 46 (1887); Robinson v. Ingram,
126 N.C. 197 at 200, 35 S.E. 612 (1900) (court would not aid in divesting an estate for
a breach "when a just compensation can be made in money • • • but will relieve against
forfeitures claimed by strict construction of any common law rule").
72 Henderson v. Beaton, (Tex. Comm. App. 1874) 1 Posey 17.
1a Ragland v. Overton, (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 44 S.W. (2d) 768.
74 83 Umv. PA. L. REv. 670 (1935); 47 HARv. L. REv. 887 (1934).
75 Rose v. Hawley, 118 N.Y. 502, 23 N.E. 904 (1890) (encroachment of adjoining
building by 16 inches on land restricted to use for public monuments only; held, grantees
not guilty of permitting a breach as they could not tell certainly whether there was a
breach or not).
76 107 Iowa 85, 77 N.W. 530 (1898).
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that at the present time unconscionable forfeitures of estates are possible or probable mainly in legal theory and only when and if a court
is totally lacking in resourcefulness. Despite the assurance one may
derive from a consciousness that the courts are ready to exert themselves
to the fullest to favor a principle of justice over obsolete legal interests,
it seems unjust that to the courts should be left perennially what is an
unpleasant task at best. Appropriate legislation would go far in remedying the situation, at least as to future creations of rights of re-entry and
possibilities of reverter. There may be a constitutional doubt, however,
as to the validity of legislation depriving one of interests which are
already in esse and valid despite change of circumstances or passage of
time.
It may be thought that the very assiduousness of the courts in relieving threatened landowners has largely contributed to legislative
inertia in this area of the law. One may even argue that the courts
offer sufficient protection with the techniques at their disposal. But it
seems hardly controvertible that, since attorneys are in no position to
advise clients in positive terms in the present state of authority, owners
may have been and may continue to be deterred from a useful and
reasonable utilization of their land.
The traditional reluctance on the part of legislatures to bring about
changes in property law for fear of upsetting titles has no reason to
assert itself in this field. Any legislation would serve the very purpose
of freeing land titles of potential or existing threats that may be brought
to bear at an unreasonable time and under unreasonable circumstances.

Rinaldo L. Bianchi, S.Ed.

